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This paper considers a simple model of zero-sum conflict between 
two players ( e.g., territorial dispute) in which costly actions ( e.g., 
terrorism) are available to one side. We identify how reputation 
effects shape the outcome of such conflict. A small prior of fanatic 
commitment type induces the possibility of costly attack followed by 
withdrawal in equilibrium. The chance of withdrawal is proportional 
to the self-inflicted cost of attack.
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I. Introduction
Many conflicts are accompanied with violent acts. These acts, often 
referred to as acts of terrorism, are designed to coerce others into actions 
they would not otherwise undertake. While terrorist attacks generate 
significant loss to their targets, some tactics inflict large and vivid dam- 
ages to the aggressors themselves. A case in point is suicide attack. In 
fact, last few decades have witnessed a rapid climb in the number of 
suicide attacks; it has grown from an average of fewer than five per 
year during the 1980s to 180 per year between 2000 and 2005, and 
from 81 suicide attacks in 2001 to 460 in 2005 (Atran 2006).
The purpose of this paper is to present a rational, game-theoretic an- 
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alysis that links the level of self-inflicted costs of attacks to the outcome 
of the conflict. We aim to offer an explanation of why many terrorist cam- 
paigns resort to actions that impose large self-inflicted costs. The key 
ingredient of our analysis is indeed motivated by the popular perspective 
of terrorism, which views it as acts that are intended to create fear 
(terror). In our model, the potential victim of attack is uncertain about 
the nature of his opponent; in particular, he believes that his opponent 
has a small chance to be a fanatic commitment type who always at- 
tacks. With such incomplete information an attack may foster fear of 
further attacks and hence facilitate concession.
Our multi-period game begins with one player occupying the territory 
of another player. In each period, the occupier decides whether or not 
to continue occupation and the occupied has the option to undertake an 
attack on the occupier. The payoff of the occupied accrues directly as a 
function of the two parties' actions. The payoff of the occupier however 
depends on the outcome of voting that takes place at the end of the 
game. We model a median voter who prefers to vote out the occupier 
(i.e., the government) if the attack occurs too frequently. The occupier 
earns a payoff if and only if he is kept in office.
This setup is motivated by Pape (2005). He finds that 95% of suicide 
attacks in recent times share the same specific strategic goal to cause 
an occupying state to withdraw forces from a disputed territory. Further- 
more, the targeted countries are usually the ones where the government 
is democratic and public opinion plays a role in determining policy.
A perturbation of the complete information game, with a small initial 
prior of the occupied being a commitment type, creates the following 
equilibrium dynamics, which are unique if the players do not use weakly 
dominated strategies. In equilibrium the occupier initially opts to stay 
but attack is undertaken with a probability that builds the occupied's 
reputation (for being fanatic) to the level at which the occupier is indif- 
ferent between occupation and withdrawal in a later period. Indeed, to 
make this initial attack behavior optimal, the occupier responds by some- 
times choosing to withdraw. The equilibrium frequency of attack depends 
on the prior and the nature of the commitment type (i.e., how likely that 
he would attack). More importantly, the probability of withdrawal is 
proportional to the cost of attack that the occupied inflicts on himself.
This paper is related to previous works in economics that attempt to 
identify a variety of potential sources of costly conflicts via game-theoretic 
reasoning. Schelling (1963) and, more recently, Baliga and Sjo ̈ström 
(2004) propose a rational account of ``spiral theory'' of war. Other reasons 
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for a costly war to break out among rational players include bargaining 
frictions (Schelling 1966) and political bias (Jackson and Morelli 2007). 
Our paper suggests reputational concerns as another source of costly 
conflicts. In terms of modeling, this paper follows the adverse-selection 
approach of reputation that dates back to Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and 
Wilson (1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982), and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the model. 
In Section 3, we identify and analyze the equilibrium. Some concluding 
remarks are offered in Section 4.
II. The Model
We analyze the following game played by three players, A (“the occu- 
pied”), B (“occupier”) and a median voter (of the “occupier”). The game 
begins with B occupying A's territory, and it lasts for three periods. In 
period 1, simultaneously, A chooses whether to “attack” or “not attack” 
and B chooses whether to “stay/occupy” or “withdraw.” If B chooses to 
withdraw in period 1, he cannot return to occupy, i.e., the game proceeds 
directly to period 3. If B chooses to stay, the game proceeds to period 2 
and the two players face the same simultaneous action choices as in 
period 1. In period 3, the median voter chooses whether to vote B ``in'' 
or “out.”
A is a either “fanatic” or “rational,” which is A's privately known type, 
and p∈(0, 1/2) is the commonly known prior of him being “fanatic” at 
the beginning of period 1. The fanatic is a commitment type who always 
attacks with probability r∈(1/2, 1).1
In each period, rational A incurs cost a if occupied and 0 if left alone; 
attack costs c if B stays and 0 if B withdraws. B obtains payoff 1 if 
voted in; 0 otherwise. In period t＝1, 2, the median voter obtains bt from 
occupation and loses dt from an attack. If B withdraws, the median 
voter experiences neither gain nor loss. The median voter's payoff from 
voting out B is normalized to 0. 
B's actions are accountable to its voters. We assume that the median 
voter votes retrospectively in the sense that, although his voting decision 
takes place after the actions of A and B over two periods, it reflects the 
payoff resulting from those actions. Specifically, if his total payoff at the 
end of period 2 is greater (less) than 0, the median voter votes B in 
1 We rule out the case of r＝1 purely to simplify the analysis. See footnote 3 
below.
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(out); if the total payoff is 0 then the median voter votes in B with pro- 
bability 1/2.
Remark 1. There is a long-standing debate about the role of elections, 
whether they serve primarily as mechanisms of democratic accountability 
(e.g., Key 1966) or as mechanisms of democratic selection (e.g., Downs 
1957). Using observational data to empirically distinguish between these 
two views is fraught with methodological difficulty.2 In a recent laboratory 
experiment, Woon (2012) finds evidence of retrospective voting behavior 
and preferences for accountability.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: a＞c.
Assumption 2: b1＝d1 and b2＜d2＜b1＋b2.
Assumption 1 ensures that a potential incentive exists on the part of 
rational A to instigate a costly attack. This can be motivated by inter- 
preting A in our game as a collective such that the cost of occupation 
is the aggregation of the individual costs experienced by all members of 
the collective. The cost of attack, on the other hand, is often borne by 
an individual member.
Assumption 2 implies two things. The first part means that after attack 
in period 1 the accrued cost and benefit from occupation remains bal- 
anced for B. The second part says that, if B decides to stay over both 
periods, the median voter will vote him in as long as attacks do not 
occur in consecutive periods. Note that, if we were to have b1＞d1(or b1
＋b2＞d1＋d2), B could guarantee re-election simply by staying for one 
period and then withdrawing in period 2 (or by staying for both periods). 
The other case where b1＜d1(and b1＋b2＜d1＋d2) also makes the problem 
uninteresting, as discussed in Remark 2 below. Overall, the main sub- 
stance of Assumption 2 is that early withdrawal cannot induce sure 
election victory or failure for B. This is reasonable in a context where 
voters face uncertainty about the net benefits of occupation when it 
lasts less than its initially projected full term. 
Next, let p̂ represent A's reputation, or B's belief at the beginning of 
period 2 that player A is fanatic. We are interested in reputation-building 
behavior of rational A; hence, whenever we refer to A below, we shall 
2 See, for instance, Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias (2008).
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mean the rational type.
The game effectively ends if B decides to withdraw in period 1. Thus, 
we can write A's behavioral strategy as a tuple (k1, k2
*, k2
** ), where k1∈
[0, 1] is the probability of attack in period 1 and k2
*, k2
**∈[0, 1] are the 
probabilities of attack in period 2 given the period 1 history of attack 
and no attack, respectively. B's behavioral strategy is a tuple (s1, s2
*,  
s2
** ), where s1∈[0, 1] is the probability of stay in period 1 and s2
*, s2
**∈
[0, 1] are the probabilities of stay in period 2 given the period 1 history 
of attack and no attack, respectively. Note that the median voter's voting 
decision is determined fully by the actions of A and B. 
A strategy profile is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) if the stra- 
tegies are mutual best responses at every history and the posterior belief 
p̂ satisfies Bayes' rule whenever possible.
III. Occupation and Terror
Our first Lemma establishes that a necessary equilibrium feature of 
the above game is that occupation and attack must occur in period 1. 
Lemma 1: In any PBE, A attacks with a positive probability and B 
stays for sure in period 1.
Proof: We start by considering B's incentives. Note that, since b1＝d1, 
this player can guarantee an expected payoff of 1/2 whether he quits in 
period 1 or 2. If he stays in period 1, at least with probability p (1－r )＞
0, attack will not occur, in which case Assumption 2 implies that staying 
on in period 2 will guarantee re-election. Thus, it is strictly dominant 
for B to stay for sure.3
Next, consider A. Suppose to the contrary of the claim; so, there is a 
PBE in which A attacks with zero probability in period 1. We have already 
show that B stays for sure. Thus, attack reveals the fanatic type and 
B's expected payoff from staying on in period 2 at such a history is equal 
to 1－r, which is less than 1/2, i.e., the payoff from withdrawal. Thus, 
in this equilibrium, B withdraws after attack in period 1. Now, consider 
A deviating in period 1 to attack. This incurs a cost of c but a gain of 
a from the subsequent withdrawal. Since a＞c (Assumption 1), such a 
deviation is profitable, a contradiction. ■
3 Note that stay is weakly dominant if r＝1. Thus, Propositions 1 and 2 below 
remain valid for this case.
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Note that if there is no attack in period 1, by Assumption 2, B will get 
voted in for sure if he continues to stay. Thus, B will stay for sure at 
such a history. A's incentives in period 2 are as follows.
Lemma 2: Consider any PBE, and suppose that B chooses to stay in 
period 1. Then, attack is weakly dominated in period 2.
Proof: Suppose that B stays with probability s at this history. Then, 
A's expected cost of attack in the continuation game is given by (a＋c)s. 
Similarly, the expected cost of not attacking is equal to as. Thus, the 
claim follows. ■
Next, suppose that in period 1 A attacks and B stays. Since there was 
an attack in the previous period, continued occupation results in B 
getting voted out if and only if another attack arrives. Let p̂ denote the 
posterior at the beginning of period 2. Then, assuming that rational A 
abstains from attack, the weakly dominated action, B's continuation ex- 
pected payoff from occupation in period 2 amounts to
p̂(1－r)＋(1－p̂).                         (1)
By Assumption 2, withdrawal in period 2 makes the median voter indif- 
ferent and, hence, vote B in with probability a half. Thus, B will con- 





Using these arguments, we construct the following equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a PBE with the following properties:
∙ In period 1, B stays for sure; A attacks with probability k*＝{p/(1－
p)}r(2r－1) such that, after attack, his reputation, p̂, becomes exactly 
1/2r.
∙ In period 2, B stays with probability s*＝(a－c)/a after attack in 
period 1, while staying for sure after no attack; A never attacks.
Proof: Given Lemmas 1 and 2, it suffices to check the two players' 
indifference conditions and corresponding mixing probabilities.
First, A's equilibrium attack probability in period 1, k*, is such that B 
is indifferent between staying and leaving in period 2 following an at- 
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as in the claim (where the inequality holds since r＞1/2).
Next, we compute B's mixing probability in period 2, s*. For this, 
consider A's indifference condition in period 1. Let C* and C** represent 
A's continuation cost at period 2 after attack and no attack  in period 
1, respectively. If A attacks in period 1, he expects to incur a total cost 
of a＋c＋C* in equilibrium; if he does not attack, the corresponding cost 
is a＋C**. To have indifference, we thus need C**＝C*＋c. Clearly, C**＝a. 
So, C*＝a－c. In period 2, if B stays, A incurs cost a; if B withdraws he 
incurs zero cost. Thus, we need to have
as*＝a－c,
yielding s*＝(a－c)/a, as in the claim. ■
Corollary 1: Lower cost of occupation, a, or higher cost of attack, c, to 
A decreases the equilibrium probability of occupation, s*.
In the above equilibrium, A randomizes in period 1 in order to build 
his reputation of being fanatic to a level sufficient to induce an incentive 
for B's withdrawal in period 2. Furthermore, in order for A to be indif- 
ferent, B must himself randomize between occupation and withdrawal 
in period 2. 
Lower cost of occupation or higher cost of attack to the occupied im- 
proves the chance of withdrawal. The intuition for this result is as fol- 
lows. Note first that lower a or higher c means less incentive on the part 
of A to attack and mimic the fanatic type. However, A's equilibrium attack 
probability, k*, is independent of these costs and given entirely by B's 
belief on the likelihood of an attack from the fanatic type (i.e., p and r). 
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Therefore, in order to compensate for A's extra loss from reputation 
building, B must withdraw in period 2 with a greater frequency.
The equilibrium constructed above is not a unique equilibrium of our 
game. In particular, there exists an equilibrium in which A attacks for 
sure in both periods and B stays in both periods only if there is no attack 
in period 1 (by the fanatic type). Since attack incurs no cost if the other 
player pulls out, it is indeed mutual best responses for A to attack and 
B to withdraw after attack in period 1 ( independently of the posterior 
belief since r＞1/2). Also, A does not want to deviate in period 1 since 
no attack prolongs occupation for sure.4 Nonetheless, we know that at- 
tack in period 2 is weakly dominated, which then leads to the following.
Proposition 2. Suppose that p＜1/2r. Then, the PBE of Proposition 1 is 
the unique PBE in which no player uses a weakly dominated strategy.
Proof. Fix any PBE in which weakly dominated strategies are rule out. 
Then, by Lemmas 1 and 2, B must stay for sure in period 1 and A must 
choose not to attack for sure in period 2. We proceed in the following 
steps.
Step 1: A must attack with an interior probability in period 1.
Given Lemma 1, it suffices to show that A cannot attack for sure. To 
show this, suppose otherwise. But then, since r＜1, the posterior belief 
following attack is strictly less than the prior p. In period 2, therefore, 
B's corresponding continuation payoff from staying is at least p(1－r)＋ 
(1－p)＝1－pr＞1/2, where the latter inequality follows from p＜1/2r. 
Thus, B must stay for sure in period 2. This then implies that it is 
profitable for A to deviate in period 1 by choosing not to attack.5
Step 2: A's attack probability in period 1 and B's occupation probability 
in period 2 are given by k* and s* in Proposition 1, respectively.
We have already argued in the proof of Proposition 1 that B must mix 
with the stated probability s* in order for A to be indifferent in period 1, 
while k* makes B indifferent in period 2. ■
Remark 2. We have so far assumed that b1＝d1 (Assumption 2). Alter- 
4 This is also a subgame perfect equilibrium of the complete information game 
with p＝0. Note that, in such a game, there also exists an equilibrium in which 
A never attacks and B always stays. It is worth noting that this latter equilib- 
rium possibility disappears in the perturbed game ( Lemma 1).
5 If p is close to 1, B will decide to withdraw after attack in period 1. However, 
A would not want to deviate in period 1 (from attack to no attack) because it would 
then surely keep B.
   A REPUTATIONAL MODEL OF CONFLICT: WHY DIE TO WIN? 231
natively, we could assume that b1＜d1 ( together with b1＋b2＜d1＋d2 so 
that two attacks remain a source of sure election loss). In this case, 
however, we obtain a very different equilibrium picture. The unique PBE 
is such that A abstains from attack and B stays in both periods for sure. 
This is because large period 1 damage from attack actually endows the 
occupier with commitment value. Once he has stayed, attack in period 
1 leads to sure election loss from withdrawal and, since there is always 
a positive chance of no attack in the second period ( r＜1), it is then 
strictly dominant for B to continue occupation in period 2. This takes 
away any incentive on the part of A to attack. 
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have set up and analyzed a simple model of conflict 
between two parties in which reputation effects generate costly outcome. 
The occupier believes that the occupied has a small chance to be a fan- 
atic commitment type who always attacks (with a probably greater than 
half ), and this allows the occupied to build reputation and force with- 
drawal by randomly attacking his opponent. We identify the determinants 
of the equilibrium probabilities of attack and withdrawal. In particular, 
a higher self-inflicted cost of attack increases the chance of withdrawal.
Our model includes a median voter whose preferences are directly in- 
fluenced by actions of the two other players while the occupier's payoffs 
are determined by the median voter's decision. One potentially fruitful 
channel of future research is to elaborate on this link between voting and 
the occupation decisions. Another extension is to consider two-sided in- 
complete information. In such a game, additional signaling by the oc- 
cupier may not only affect the attack decisions of the occupied but also 
the voting decisions of his own citizens.
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